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In the aerospace industry competitive advantage is searched through
product innovation. This paper sets out to explore the effects that
relationship development in the commercial aerospace supply chains have
on innovation and competitive advantage. A perspective of supply chains
as complex activity networks is used for data analysis based on in-depth
interviews in a global setting. Applying these concepts of supply chains as
the interaction of multiple work activities assists in comprehending the
forces of change. The processes of change are characterized by expansive
learning processes of creating instruments for initializing, developing and
sustaining these relationships. These processes take place in a terrain of
complex power exercises. The long-term effects are totally dependent on
nurturing the relationships. The findings may be useful to practitioners in
understanding how implementation of successful supply chain changes
may come about. It promotes risk-sharing partnerships as instruments for
innovation. The paper provides evidence of changing relationships in
commercial aerospace supply chains.
Introduction
In response to fiercer competition in the global marketplace, there has been a
call for innovative solutions in terms of products, technologies and practices at the
same time as reducing lead-time and costs (Rose-Anderssen et al., 2005; Goffin et al.,
2006). The obvious approach to reduce lead time and costs has been to adopt the
lean practices of the automotive industries. The key principles of lean practices are
open dependencies between business partners, just-in-time deliveries and no
wastage of resources and materials (Womack et al., 1990). Creating innovative
solutions, however, requires going beyond the improvement of adopting practices
used within other industries and by competitors. Competitive advantage can be
enhanced through introducing radically new products into the market. Veryzer (1998)
refers to these new products as discontinuous innovations, where the products
have been designed beyond customers’ imagination. In that sense creative
performance and innovation can be positively influenced by what Kratzer et al.
(2006) refer to as team polarity. Team polarity is defined as the difference in opinions
and perspectives among members of innovative teams. In this paper, Kratzer et al.’s
polarity is referred to as diversity.
The case study presented has its focus on the global competition in the market
for large commercial aircraft. Risk-sharing partnerships are used as instruments for
enhancing innovation and competitive advantage for a new aircraft model; the tenet
being that risk-sharing partnerships allows for exploratory processes and financial
strength that go beyond the limited creative capacity of a firm working alone. The
paper then presents supply chains as evolutionary networks of multiple work
activities. These work activities are discussed in terms of the evolutionary
transformation of relationships at boundaries. Within this discussion a model of
the instrumentality of relationships as complex evolutionary processes is
introduced. Following this, a method of data collection is proposed and justified. The
case is then discussed within the framework of the model in the specific context of
one airframe manufacturer and its suppliers.
A combination of an activity theoretical approach and complex systems thinking
is applied for analysing these processes of change. Work activities are characterized
by the multi-voiced interaction created within them, and their potential for expansive
transformation (Engeström, 2001). In this communicative interaction, the diversity of
opinions and perspectives create contradictions that play a central role as sources of
change and development. Contradictions are historically accumulated tensions within
and between activity networks (Engeström, 2001). In these activities there are
continuous processes for creation of new instruments for change (Engeström,
1987).
Risk-Sharing Partnerships as Instruments for Innovation
A supply chain can be defined as the integration of the flow of information and
materials between customers, manufacturers and suppliers (Samaranayake, 2005).
There are different aerospace supply chain forms. These are characterized by changing
practices in the evolutionary adaptation to market realities and to proactive responses to
increased competition (Rose-Anderssen et al., 2009). The adaptation can be
exemplified in lean practices, where complex networks of suppliers and customers are
closely integrated into long-term relationships for reducing costs and ensuring high
quality (Cagliano et al., 2004). Risk-sharing partnerships, on the other hand, are
proactive responses to increased competition.
Traditionally airframe manufacturers handled most of the risk associated with
innovation, development and production (Williams et al., 2002). Risk-sharing
partnerships, however, spread this risk at the same time as influence and revenue
is shared between the partners. Risk-sharing partnerships used as instruments for
enhancing creative capacity is based on the intention of integrating a diverse division
of labour and expertise held by each partner company. It is the synergetic effects
caused by collaboration on diversity of perspectives through constructive dialogue
while creating a shared voice and vision (John-Steiner, 2000) that is sought when
bringing firms into collective partnerships. From the point of division of expertise,
Gemünden et al. (2007) have studied the roles of innovators in highly innovative
ventures. In this so-called German approach, four types of promoters of innovation are
identified. First, there is the power promoter who has the necessary hierarchical power
to drive a project. Second, there is the expert promoter who has the specific technical
knowledge for the innovation process. Third, the process promoter has the expertise
of organizational know-how and network building. Fourth, the relationship promoter has
the strong personal ties outside the organization. Although this paper is not about
individuals in the single firm, our findings regarding individual firms engaged in
radical innovations in aircraft production fit the role models of the German
approach (Table 1). As will be seen in this paper, the instruments used in
these roles are important for large-scale commercial aircraft innovation.
Pritchard and MacPherson (2004, 2007) are concerned about the substantial
technology transfer from the prime contractor to globally- located risk-sharing partners
and the loss of jobs among skilled workers and designers in the Western
commercial aircraft sector.
Table 1. Innovation Process
Role
The German
single firm
approach
The aerospace supply chain approach
1 Power promoter Airframe manufacturer
2 Expert promoter Expert risk-sharing partners
3 Process promoter Large scale integrators; risk-sharing
partners
4 Relationship
promoter
Airframe manufacturer towards airlines and
risk-sharing partners
Risk-sharing partners towards suppliers, their
local governments and airlines
Nonetheless, Romano (2003) argues that supply network partners, in realizing their
interdependencies, seek to improve the competitiveness of the network as a
whole. Complex global networks of one airframe manufacturer and its suppliers are
formed to reduce financial, technological and market access barriers (Esposito,
2004). The reality shift from the traditional local subcontractor base is also enforced
by the fact that there is a growth demand in the key emerging markets (Lefebvre &
Lefebvre, 1998).
Changing the form of relationship from one type to another is not only a matter of
choice but also a matter of capacity to do so. The realistic point of departure here is
to assess the reality of power regimes within the supply network and adapt and work
according to these (Cox, 2004). The lack of general appropriateness of supplier
development models and supply chain managed models is that they both become
effective in situations of buyer dominance and interdependence only. Risk-sharing
partnerships emphasize the importance of the latter. In this regime of relationships,
technological innovation depends particularly on the co-ordination and integration
activities ensuring durable relationships between customers and suppliers (Lefebvre &
Lefebvre, 1998).
Activity Networks and Boundary Crossing
Aerospace supply chains are complex systems of power relationships. Complex
systems thinking, pioneered in the natural sciences by I. Prigogine and his colleagues
in the 1970s, is attaining increasing recognition for understanding change, adaptation
and evolutionary processes within social and industrial settings. Cultural-historical
Activity Theory was founded by L. Vygotsky, A.N. Leont’ev and A.R. Luria in Soviet-
Russia in the 1920–1930s. This theory is a philosophical framework for studying
different forms of human work practices and their transformation.
The theoretical concepts in this section will be applied to the evolutionary framework
of Figure 1.
Figure 1. Instrumentality of Relationships as Complex Evolutionary Processes
A work activity is a complex network of individuals and their human artefacts (Rose-
Anderssen & Allen, 2008). As such it is a developmental process connecting the
individual and the social levels through their human artefacts and their object
orientation. In these complex networks the physical reality is governed by the complex
set of invisible effects of individuals interacting by using a diversity of opinions and
experiences (Rose-Anderssen et al., 2005). The network as a whole may therefore
potentially adapt and respond to the environment in multiple and unpredictable ways
(Allen, 2001a). It is the excess diversity that fuels adaptation, exploration and
change. Innovation is therefore restricted when diversity is reduced and
standardization is increased (McCarthy, 2004). As an activity is already a network, the
supply chain becomes a complex network of multiple work activities. Here individuals
interact within and across boundaries between companies. The human artefacts are
similarly used within and across company boundaries.
The Evolution of a Work Activity and the Significance of History
The elements of the activity are represented by the individual subjects of consideration,
their activity community, the object and the mediating human artefacts. There are three
mediating artefacts. The instruments mediate between the individual and the object.
The social rules mediate between the individual and the activity community. And the
division of labour and expertise mediates between the community and the object. It is
important to make a distinction between object and objectives. Objectives are rigidly
independent of individual conceptions, personal bias, thoughts and feelings. An object,
however, is the emerging vision that integrates the elements of the activity
(Figure 2).
Qualitative change can occur when there are disturbances between the elements. That
is, change occurs at moments of instability when some new aspects or elements grow
in the system, restructure it, and invade new dimensions. Thus new properties of the
elements continually emerge (Rose-Anderssen et al., 2005), making the outcome
unpredictable in detail. The emerging changes to supply chains beyond individual
human control must therefore always be of concern through collective efforts. Under
these dynamic circumstances, the relationships between the elements are therefore
in continual processes of modification. And they take multiple and diverse forms within
the time of the activity (Foucault, 1972). In other words, as people try to change
and develop an activity, they are themselves changed by their adaptation to these
changes.
The object is central for integrating individual action into a collective activity. The
point of departure is the identification of a problem or an opportunity. In the
case and results section, the airframe manufacturer identifies a potential opportunity
to gain a competitive advantage through closer integration of key suppliers. This is the
initiation of an object formation process with the basis in risk- sharing partnerships.
Identification of new potential opportunities
Instruments for initializing new relationships
Instruments for developing
close relationships
Instruments for sustaining
close relationships
Risk sharing partnerships
Figure 2. Complex Activity Network
The Mediating Artefacts of Work Activities
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The Complex Dynamics of Work Activities
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An object can occupy two different roles. First, it functions as an object and then it
may function as an instrument (Foot, 2002). This paper explores the instruments
used for the object of developing relationships in supply chains. Simultaneously the
developing relationships are used for enhancing innovation.
Knowledge and Routines versus Expansive Learning
Miettinen and Virkunnen (2005) argue that notions of routine and rule-governed
action do not explain the emergence of new practices. Traditionally, routines have
been conceptualized as carriers of regular and predictable practices. From that
perspective routines are seen as carriers of an organization’s skills and knowledge. In
supply chains this becomes more difficult as the chain is a meeting place of several
companies’ different routines.
Going beyond the limitations of routines in a rapidly changing environment,
communities with the ability to learn will prevail over communities with optimal, but
fixed behaviour (Allen, 2001b). In that sense Blackler (1995) argues that the notion
of knowledge should rather be seen as a dynamic process of social construction, the
knowing in doing. That is, at moments of instability, during which knowledge is
transformed, qualitative and structural change can be created (Rose-Anderssen et al.,
2005). In other words, it is the transformation of knowledge in order to adapt the
supply chain to the future that is interesting. This means releasing the creative
capacity within the supply chain into these unstable situations. Here, individuals start
questioning present practices and suggest new models of practice. When these
challenged models descend to the practical level of implementation, and are tested
out in practice, this collective movement has become an expansive learning process
(Engeström, 1987). These expansive learning processes, Engeström argues,
should be viewed as partially destructive rejection of old perspectives and practices. As
collective practices, collaboration between firms on developing radically new
products also becomes practice in developing close relationships. The learning in doing
therefore transforms both knowledge and relationships.
Dilemma Situations and Boundaries
Dilemma situations occur at boundaries (Kerosuo & Engeström, 2003). A
boundary is crossed as an individual tries out new instruments in interaction with
another individual in order to inquire or negotiate a common object for creation of
alternative practices. At the social level essential dilemmas cannot be resolved
through individual actions alone. Here it is the collective creation of new instruments
that resolves the dilemma. In that sense, evolving inner contradictions are the chief
sources of movement and change in the activity network. For the supply chain
as such the inner contradictions are, as Kratzer et al. (2006) argue, the potential
for creative performance.
In supply chains, boundaries are therefore experienced when old practices do not
work. This may occur when involving suppliers from low cost economy (LCE) countries
or when trying to search for more innovative solutions.
Developing close relationships are collective processes. These processes are
characterized by dismantling those old routines that would inhibit relationships
across company boundaries. The instrument risk-sharing partnerships can be used as a
crowbar for negotiating how to collectively proceed. And that is a continuous dialogical
process of questioning present practices and how to change these.
Power, Distance, Trust and Relationships
Power differences create boundaries. In that sense traditional supply chain forms of
buyer dominance create boundaries. Power is really shifting from action to action
(Engeström, 2000), and it is therefore shifting from actor to actor (Foucault, 1980;
Giddens, 1982). Therefore the ability of any individual to construct reality is
completely dependent on their place in the activity process, mediated by the division
of labour (Engeström, 2000).
Power and distance issues are a challenge to master in human relationships. Scollon
and Scollon (1983) argue that the way we speak or the way our discourse systems
work are governed by both the way individuals or groups value or assume a
relationship when an imposition is put upon them in terms of power relationships,
and the distance between self and the other (in terms of closeness of relationship). In
that respect, meaningful interactive relationships between people are facilitated by
trust as it produces mutual expectations (Bachmann, 2003). Mutual expectations are
developed through the object formation process. Trust is associated with the risk
of things going wrong (Nooteboom & Six, 2003). However, as people interact and share
experiences, they may learn about their potential partner’s needs, which may
change their assumptions, and may eventually create a mutual platform of trust
(Rose-Anderssen & Allen, 2008). Due to the issue of risk, people may also substitute
trust with control. Control as a trust substitute is characterized by formal, contractual
control with an imposition of procedures for monitoring (Nooteboom, 2003). As a
substitute for control, rational trust would be based on evidence of the partner’s
competence and intentions to conform.
In practice, rational trust becomes the criteria used for supplier selection.
However, sustaining close relationships is a continuous effort of nurturing mutual
expectations.
The Dynamic Connection between Multiple Work Activities
Supply chains as evolutionary networks of multiple work activities can be presented in
its simplest form as the interaction between two companies in Figure 3 (see
Engeström, 2001). Dilemma situations are experienced at boundaries between firms.
The object formation process in the diffuse boundary zone between Company A and
Company B in Figure 3 is as follows. First, Objects A and B are the objects
Company A and Company B respectively start off forming within each company. These
are the visions or purposes each company is collectively developing for their role in the
supply chain. Secondly, Objects A2 and B2 are the emerging objects the companies
bring into the boundary zone of collaboration between them. Object C, therefore, is
Company A’s and Company B’s collaborative understanding of their collective work
activity. The difference between A2 and B2 makes the boundary zone, Object C,
emerge.
The risk-sharing partnership can be characterized by a continuous object formation
process in sometimes multiple and diffuse boundary zones. In this context, as
Lektorsky (1984) argues, the object becomes clearer as people co-explore this
boundary zone.
In the case results and discussion section, the evolutionary transformations of
relationships in boundary zones are explored within the framework of Figure 1.
Method of Data Collection
This paper is a part outcome of a three-year research project on the evolution of
commercial aerospace supply chains. Data was collected in two steps: a literature
research and interviews. The research started off by conducting a literature
research on: supply chains in general; on aerospace supply chains specifically;
historical accounts of aircraft production; literature on evolution, learning,
knowledge and change; and data from company internet sources. The treatment of
data involved systematic coding of categories identified in the texts. It meant a
process of continuous comparison and recoding of categories. The data was used to
create an evolutionary classification scheme of commercial aerospace supply chains. It
concluded the first phase of the project.
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The advantage of individual interviews over focus group interviews, however, is
the control the interviewer has with closer communication with the interviewee (Morgan,
1997). Our experience, however, is that our interviews of focus groups became close
conversations between the interviewees. This peer interaction helped expand on the
issues to be explored. The interviewees collaborated in an activity where the object
was to explore and make sense of specific issues. Therefore due to the
interviewees’ complementary insights, the synergies produced were an expansion of
what the individuals could have produced alone. The atmosphere also became
more relaxed than in the individual interviews where the individual would be under
constant pressure to perform.
Case Results and Discussions
In the following sections, a developmental process of changing supply chain
relationships is presented. The success of one supply chain form of highly
collaborative relationships between airframe manufacturer, airlines and first-tier
suppliers for one aircraft model is developed into risk-sharing partnerships for a new
aircraft model.
The Instrumentality of Relationships in Aerospace Supply Chains
Identification of Competitive Advantage – Relationship Promotion
When the airframe manufacturer was losing market share, an initial dilemma
occurred. They chose to involve more strongly the needs of airlines. This was the point
of departure of the collaborative supply chain form.
A decade ago really, probably, [we] felt like it applied more to working together
with our airline customers as a stronger connection. In driving the product
design the airlines were embodied in the model [xxx] plane, which has got a
huge part of the market compared to the competition. (Airframe manufacturer,
interviewee 1)
Bringing the customer into the activity of aircraft design increased the diversity of
perspectives influencing an object for user-friendly aircraft design. The positive
experience with close relationships to airlines also encouraged close relationships to be
developed with suppliers. These relationships were used as instruments for bringing
together latent expertise for producing more customer desirable aircraft.
And I think we have learned, we have been learning that aspect of collaboration
applies in more than just as [with] the customer. So we have been moving in a
direction to be more collaborative with our partners. Sharing more, earlier,
involving them earlier and more deeply in our design. So that collectively we
can achieve something better than the old producer system. (Airframe
manufacturer, Interviewee 1)
The identification of a relationship form that potentially could facilitate innovation
and competitive advantage was the point of departure of forming a new object
(Object A in Figure 3). Expanding on imagining the future happened through the
entrepreneurial step where the airframe manufacturer brought selected suppliers into
the boundary zone for developing a shared object (Object C in Figure 3)
Instruments for Initializing New Relationships – Power and Expert Promotion
The aircraft manufacturer was the company that had to face the airlines in the
market directly. Thus their interpretation of market demand was essential for the
success of the supply chain as a whole. And in that sense, the airframe manufacturer
as a major customer of the suppliers was in a position of power to impose a
reflection of the airlines’ demand. Although the supply chain hierarchy had not changed
at the initialization stage, a mutual need situation had been created. It was in the
interests of both the airframe manufacturer and the suppliers to sustain their
presence in the market.
Bringing the airlines and its suppliers into an object formation process of user-
friendly design and adopting the practices used by competitors, gave the airframe
manufacturer competitive ability with the plane xxx. But it did not give them
competitive advantage as they had only made marginal improvements to existing
airplane concepts. In other words, they were listening to market needs but they did
not create and present something radically new to the market.
I think that was taking an existing plane and making point solutions. It was taking
low risk and a conservative approach. We made improvements with the cockpit, the
navigation system, the seating and storage. They were what I call point solutions
integrated. (Airframe manufacturer, interviewee 2)
A more proactive response to the fiercer global competition was made when the
airframe manufacturer considered a relationship form that could give them competitive
advantage. Therefore to be able to move beyond the marginal improvements based on
the imagination of the customer (Veryzer, 1998), they needed to cross boundaries
into the unknown. This meant moving totally away from old concepts of aircraft design.
The airframe manufacturer realized that this could not be resolved through their own
actions alone (Kerosuo & Engeström, 2003). Risk-sharing partnership was the
relationship form that could connect the diverse capacity needed for radical change.
The selection criteria were based on rational trust. This was built on long-term
relationships, and upfront issues of financial and technological capabilities.
You almost have a different requirement of a supplier upfront capabilities. But
those capabilities now quickly move into a sustaining load. They are a very
different set of capabilities. The upfront capabilities
are characterized by financial and technological capacities. (Airframe manufacturer,
interviewee 3)
Changing well-established relationships meant divorcing old routines and practices.
The airframe manufacturer was in power to do so. Therefore change could be initiated
by the airframe manufacturer withdrawing existing items such as long-term contracts
and replacing them with new risk-sharing contracts.
And if you look at the main contracts, for example, for the [new airplane], they
have called back the terms we have with them, pretty much straight through. And it
is a partnership you know. They have become really a part of our business in the way
their contract reflects. There is risk associated with that obviously. (European
mechanical systems supplier, interviewee 1)
The power of expertise gave the selected supplier an advantage towards the
airframe manufacturer. This contractual interdependency between the airframe
manufacturer and supplier empowered the supplier as long as he complied with
the contract. However, once contracts had been signed, the power of national airlines
to demand use of suppliers from their own country was part of that complex
system. This power exercise was balanced through the airframe manufacturer and risk-
sharing partners’ choice of suppliers in these countries to promote sales of planes and
secure local maintenance for the aftermarket of equipment and systems. Thus the
supply chain became a complex system of power relationships (Engeström, 2000).
We essentially take into account market access. We take into account access to
capital market, access to technology. (Airframe manufacturer, interviewee 3)
We also approached one country to develop engineering skills because we know
that when we introduce commercial aircraft into a commercial market, those airlines
would need engineers help them maintain those airplanes. We have network
relationships and an infrastructure that supports those sales. (Airframe
manufacturer, interviewee, 2)
We have global relationships with suppliers of the new aircraft model and these
are different. These are actually risk-sharing partners. We ask them to take on the
design, the certification and the fully integrated work for key elements of that
aeroplane. (Airframe manufacturer, interviewee 4)
We need other companies to be risk-sharing partners that could be financially, but
also be from a sales standpoint. So it also mitigates our risk investing billions of
dollars on our own. We now have partners with us who help look at this.
(Airframe manufacturer, interviewee 2)
Although the relationships evolved from a mutual need situation, the selection of
partners was based on rational trust (Nooteboom, 2003). That is, the tier below
had to show competence and intentions to conform to the impositions put upon them
from above.
Only we are healthy enough to invest a huge amount of money for this project,
and [have the] human resources, [and the] technical background. Those three
factors. Our process itself is quite lean in its design. It was designed that way.
(Japanese materials supplier, interviewee 1)
We have invested [a] very huge [amount of] money to build our new facilities
for the [new aircraft model]. [The airframe manufacturer] is applying lean
[systems]. They are directing us to build under their instructions, [and] learning
lean concepts. Our general manager and executive have changed their mind. We
must be lean. So we are trying to be lean. Our suppliers stay in previous situation.
First, we must learn, then we will teach them. (Japanese structural supplier,
interviewee 1)
First-tier suppliers with a long history of compliance with the airframe manufacturer
satisfied the initial criteria for rational trust.
Another one is [our] accumulated role of history with the airframe manufacturer
[of] more than 10 years. So this activity, the reliability of us has been increased.
This is quite [an] important factor [for] why we are selected. (Japanese materials
supplier, interviewee 1)
Conclusively, a complex system of interacting instruments was used for initializing new
relationships. First, the airframe manufacturer used the mutual need situation as an
instrument for proposing change. Simultaneously, the key suppliers could use the
rational trust they had built up with the airframe manufacturer as an instrument
whereby they would be selected as risk-sharing partners. Second, the airframe
manufacturer used their power as an instrument to change contracts. Simulta-
neously, the key suppliers used their power of unique expertise, financial resources
and access to their local markets to negotiate their position in the supply chain.
Instruments for Developing Close Relationships – Process Promotion
The interviewees realized that it is beneficial to develop relationships based on more trust
and transparency. One approach that could potentially develop into mutual
expectations and into long-term relationships occurred when a supplier was
encouraged to develop their products for their own future benefits. The supplier
thereby became more innovative at the same time as the customer received more
innovative systems and units of systems. By developing their expertise these lower
tier suppliers changed their relationships by becoming suppliers of whole units. In
these hierarchical regimes, first-tier suppliers actually empowered low cost economy
(LCE) suppliers to become more trusted by letting them make simple parts first;
thereby letting them gradually learn, develop competence and thus develop closer
relationships to their customer. However, creative initiatives are not advantageous for
an aircraft model if they are not introduced based on mutual expectations. These
mutual expectations must come about through a collective object formation process
on what kinds of innovations fit airline demands at the same time as they fit the
production systems of the aircraft model.
To develop relationships takes a lot of that informal conversation in trust and cre-
ditability through your words. (Airframe manufacturer, interviewee 2)
And developing a relationship we try to get more trust in that relationship and more
transparency in that relationship. Relationships are a very cyclic thing. Partly
because we haven’t got clear commodity strategies, we tend to be very dependent
on the chemistry between CEO of a suppliers and the appropriate senior person in-
house. I think the relationship side of it and supplier selection is really based on
who you know. (Engine supplier, interviewee 1)
If we identify something we want to work at together with a supplier then we will
have an Early Suppliers Engagement contract. And that contract clarifies who
owns the intellectual property. And we use that value of the IP as part of the benefit
of working with the suppliers. [It] gives them the opportunity to exploit that
technology. (Engine supplier, interviewee 2)
We give the LCE suppliers a development plan. Start them [off] with fairly simple
stuff. You are building the relationship on maybe some machine part, and then
you start to step up to complete design and manufacture of an actuator or an
entire gearbox or something like that. (European mechanical systems supplier,
interviewee 2)
So we have a supplier that comes up with a really good idea. But our customer says:
we are not going to accept that. They want a stable thing. Also when a supplier
comes up with a new idea and technology, getting it on an existing programme is
very difficult in terms of incorporation. We are learning that we have to get better
co-ordination on where they are spending their R&D money. (Airframe manufacturer,
interviewee 3)
Triangular relationships between a first-tier supplier, western prototype suppliers and
LCE mass producers of a unit illustrate a collective approach to a global
production dilemma situation.
As far as supplier relationships are concerned, we are trying to involve some of
our traditional suppliers in co-operative arrangements with [suppliers in] low cost
economies. So that means, the machined [parts] suppliers would be involved at
the prototyping stage. The parts in the volume production phase may be offloaded
to a low cost country area. (Electrical systems supplier, interviewee 1)
Developing supply chain relationships, as the case shows, is not a
straightforward process of implementation. Despite the point of departure, there is
an intention to collaborate. Beyond the point of the contract agreement, the
developmental process relies on very individual interactions in the boundary zone
(Figure 3) between the companies.
Distinct cultural boundaries create another dilemma in yet another diffuse boundary zone
(Figure 3) between companies in the supply chain. Although the situation is between
risk- sharing partners, this is most typically exemplified by the difference between
Japanese and American practices (Cristiano et al., 2000). The Japanese individual
assumes collective obedience to the system and the level above, and therefore
assumes power difference and distance to strangers. On contrast, the American
individual would relate to a more individualistic regime of low power difference and
small distance to strangers and more freedom of action for the individual.
You literally have to watch the Japanese all the way to get them to [perform],
handholding, walking through [the process at] every level of their organization to
get them to go at the risk level and speed we need to go ahead. (Airframe
manufacturer, interviewee 5)
The boundary zone therefore becomes even more diffuse when one partner company
has to guide another partner due to different cultural performance expectations.
These problems are therefore not specific to risk-sharing partnerships, but are due
to mismatch of collaborative skills across cultural boundaries.
However, collaboration across company interfaces is not only a challenge between
Asian and Western companies. As the case shows, integrating the global network
of airplane structure risk-sharing partners also needs substantial developmental
attention.
The airplane structures suppliers are difficult to integrate. The co-ordination and
integration is maybe one of the keys to successful companies. We see ourselves
as large-scale integrators. (Airframe manufacturer, interviewee 5)
As the risk-sharing relationships’ intended collective practices are not fully
implemented, it means that the airframe manufacturer as a large-scale
integrator still has to make impositions on suppliers. Thus in line with Cox’s
(2004) argument, the interdependence between risk-sharing partners and the domi-
nance by the airframe manufacturer is necessary for the development of these
suppliers and for making the supply chain effective.
Top-down or bottom-up innovations are realities in any kind of customer/supplier
relationship. However, neither encourages collaboration as mutual expectations are not
met. Whether it is in relationships between risk-sharing partners or between different
tiers in the supply chain, identifying something together takes place in a boundary
zone of mutual expectations. This collective object formation for identifying the ‘new’
together can thus be made to fit the process of production as well as customer
needs. The main thing is that those affected by constructing something new are
involved in decision-making processes. Although risk-sharing partnerships are
supposed to enhance innovation through bringing together a diversity of expertise and
the financial resources to invest in exploration and innovative solutions, in this case
these relationships are still at a developmental stage. It seems that different and
established company routines of fixed behaviour (Allen, 2001) are inhibiting the
ability to learn outside existing boundaries and thereby to participate in an object
formation across company boundaries.
Instruments for Sustaining Close Relationships and Innovation
As important as it was to destroy obsolete artefacts, it was important to establish
new enduring artefacts to support new forms of relationships. The question will
therefore always be whether new enduring artefacts such as contracts, e-portals,
design and engineering structure adjustment programmes and product planning
tools can be effectively used across company interfaces not only at present but also
are flexible enough for the supply chain to sustain into the future.
[For] the integration of communication and data transfer, we have developed
portals in our systems of design and engineering that enable us to work with our
suppliers and researchers and partners at a completely virtual basis. (Airframe
manufacturer, interviewee 4)
Sustaining close supply chain relationships requires effort beyond establishing enduring
artefacts. Compared to sustaining relationships within a single firm, sustaining
relationships between firms is more complex. This is because the distance and
power issues may be more pronounced in a supply chain than within an individual
firm. First, people are separated physically by interacting from different
localities, making it more difficult to build up the trust that naturally evolves
between people in daily face-to-face contact. Second, there is an inherent power
present in customer/supplier relationships. The risk- sharing partnership, however,
invites at least a decrease in power difference between partners due to the strong
interdependence the unique diverse expertise held by each partner gives. Therefore
to take advantage of this diversity, it is realized that face-to-face and other more
direct personal interaction across company boundaries are paramount for
nurturing relationships. Multi-voicedness is represented through personal
relationships. These serve as nodes between firms, and echoes Engelstad and
Gustavsen’s (1993, p. 244) findings. They claim that the network can be seen as
consisting not of the participating organizations but of groups of actors linked to
each other where the groups operate according to the principle of a democratic
dialogue internally as well as in relation to each other.
Today it is much more of an open communication, working together, and [with] con-
tinuous improvement. The sustaining part is characterized by close relationships and
collaboration. (Airframe manufacturer, interviewee 5)
Things like schedules, purchase orders, the transactional parts of the
relationship happen via e-portals through [the] internet now with all our suppliers. It
is an excellent system. Suppliers like it and it works very well. What we lost was
the interaction between people. But we now have material controllers who own
relationships with suppliers. And they know the person, and that relationship is
better. (Electrical systems supplier, interviewee 2)
The types of relationships with customers and suppliers tend to be very individual
kind of responses. It depends upon the company you have relationships with,
and what their philosophy is. (Japanese materials supplier interviewee 2)
In this case, practising development and sustainability of the risk-sharing partnerships
are done in the context of a new aircraft model development. This context changes
due to the disturbances between the connected activities (Rose-Anderssen et al.,
2005). As the case shows, these disturbances come about as there are imperfect
actions promoting corrective actions in a dynamic context of transformation. Although
the relationships are immature, the collective investment in unique expertise and
financial resources are producing very promising outcomes in terms of a conceptually
new aircraft. Thus, even if the boundary zone between firms regarding details may
sometimes be diffuse, due to the open space for negotiations and peer guidance
the risk- sharing partnership gives, successful innovation is achieved.
Throughout the world, our new airplane is recognized as an extraordinarily high tech-
nology advanced aircraft. People believed that we have stepped out a very
innovative solution. We have stretched the boundaries of technology, offered a
unique solution that has never been offered to the industry before. We are an
extremely risk aversive company. And I think this is an indication we have started
to accept risk and be innovative. Quite honestly we have to be global. We have
those relationships. So globally, I think those relationships are really
important. (Airframe manufacturer, interviewee 2)
So we go into production of [the new airplane] around, well it starts next year.
And it wraps up quite quickly because they have been very successful [with that]
aircraft. (European mechanical systems supplier, interviewee 2)
In conclusion, shared ownership to building an aircraft, multi-voicedness and suc-
cessful innovation of new aircraft became instruments for sustaining relationships.
A successful outcome in terms of an innovative product can be argued to be the
strongest ingredient for nurturing risk-sharing partnerships. And this helps develop the
relationship further.
Risk-Sharing Partnerships as Instruments for Innovation
The model of the instrumentality of relationships (Figure 1) has been used to mould
the text in these subsections into an interactive model of supply chain relationship
evolution. This complex evolutionary model confirms risk-sharing partnerships as
strong instruments for innovation (Figure 4).
The aim of risk-sharing partnerships is to go beyond simple technology transfer. It is
about knowledge and technology transformation as a collective process for creating
entirely new concepts of aircraft technology. As such, it is interesting as it
expands the capacities to go beyond present capabilities to achieve competitive
advantage in the global space. The collective investment into this expansion is what
risk-sharing is about.
Western suppliers as well as their global competitors were initially invited to present
their up-front capabilities to engage in risk- sharing partnerships. Sadly, many
Western suppliers are not prepared to do that.
We need to find suppliers who can grow and develop, and contribute to the
innovation process. I think, by and large, most Western suppliers have not
woken up to this reality. They can’t develop. They can’t be our suppliers as we
need to go forward. (European mechanical systems supplier, interviewee 2)
That meaning we need to take more of a risk letting them get on with it.
The question is; there are not many suppliers that are big enough to carry on
a mass project development. (Engine supplier, interviewee 2)
However, risk-sharing partnerships are open and transparent relationships for the
sharing of experiences. Knowledge created by partners during the processes of
aircraft development is shared. They are therefore gaining knowledge they would
not necessarily have developed alone. To enhance competitive advantage, the
airframe manufacturer invites the best expertise available from the global space
into risk-sharing partnerships. Innovation is therefore not out- sourced or
transferred; it is created within the risk-sharing partnership. Although knowledge is
shared, early supplier engagement contracts may protect intellectual property
rights.
Changing practices to support risk-sharing partnerships is a major step in the
evolution of commercial aerospace supply chains. Risk- sharing partnerships facilitate
going beyond the limitations of incremental innovation. It is about the collective
approach to airplane technology transformation. Advances in new concepts in aircraft
design based on advances in material technology help facilitate that. Pritchard and
MacPherson’s (2004, 2007) concern about substantial technology transfer from US
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Concluding Remarks: Theoretical and Practical Implications
The paper set out to explore the effect of risk-sharing partnership on innovation and
competitive advantage in the market for large commercial aircraft. This was done using
an evolutionary model of the transformation of relationship practices. Within the
framework of the model, a case of one supply chain was analysed using a combination
of activity theory and complex systems thinking.
Through the perspectives of activity theory and complex systems thinking, the
transformation of a supply chain relationship form from the level of collaborative
practices to the collective practices of risk-sharing partnerships was discussed. It is
the strong collective effort by the risk-sharing partners to develop common objects for
their shared activities that connects and develops the diversity of expertise and
opinions into a dynamic process that could otherwise have led to pulling the supply
chain in multiple directions. Since this supply chain is still immature in terms of object
comprehension for some parts, guidance is needed to make the object clearer.
Kratzer et al.’s (2006) argument that creative performance and innovation can be
positively affected by a diversity of influences is supported by this paper. In previous
collaborative supply chain relationships, the airframe manufacturer took most of the
risk associated with innovation, development and production (Williams et al., 2002).
This domination by the airframe manufacturer is in this case gradually transformed
into a more multi-voiced relationship of diverse company capabilities. The expert
partners are given the responsibility to develop their high technology products
within the context of the common object. This is neither top-down nor bottom-up
innovation but an individual contribution in a collective setting.
The case discussed in this paper indicates the synergetic effects of bringing together
a diversity of high technology expert companies to produce radical innovation.
Implementing global risk-sharing partnerships is a complex developmental process
as they have to be adapted across different cultural boundaries. The practical
learning is therefore that there are no standard solutions to the implementation
processes. They are subject to trial and error in diffuse boundary zones of collective
object formation processes of trust-building and mutual expectation development.
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